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CONTINUITY AND RENEWAL AT THE TOP: 
PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF THE LEVEL, EXTENT, TYPE AND 
FREQUENCY OF TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM CHANGES  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines performance effects of changes in the top management team using 
an eleven-year period longitudinal research design with a sample of 45 major Dutch 
multinationals. Since changes at the top are a multi-faceted phenomenon, we study the 
topic from four different angles. Results indicate that the level of change in terms of CEO 
versus non-CEO changes and the extent of change in terms of the proportion of managers 
entering or exiting the team do not influence subsequent firm performance. Type and 
frequency of change however do matter. Our results indicate that renewal of top 
management teams in terms of non-retirement exits and limited outside entries can be 
beneficial for firm performance in the following year, especially when exits and entries 
are well aligned. On the other hand, a certain degree of continuity is also warranted. Too 
many outside entries at the same time were found to be disadvantageous in the short-run, 
while many CEO successions in a row were found to be disadvantageous in the longer-
run.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Reaching the top of the corporate ladder may be difficult, but staying there seems to be an 
equal challenge. Approximately 40 of the 200 largest corporations in the US replaced 
their CEO in 2000 compared to 23 in 1999 (Leonard, 2001). A similar finding is reported 
by the second annual survey of CEO turnover by management consulting firm Booz 
Allen Hamilton, which indicates that CEO turnover in Europe and Asia continues to rise 
(Corporate Board, 2003). Also turnover of other top executives is known to be rather 
frequent. Empirical studies among large US firms reported executive turnover rates of 
more than 30% during the late 1970s and mid 1980s (Jackson, Brett, Sessa, Cooper, Julin 
& Peyronnin, 1991; Wagner, Pfeffer & O'Reilly, 1984). A more recent study among 
Dutch multinational companies found comparably high figures for the late 1990s 
(Godthelp & Glunk, 2003).  
 These results are intriguing since turnover at the top is an event of strategic and 
symbolic significance, for both internal and external stakeholders, as it can both 
symbolize and trigger fundamental changes in the strategic activities of a firm (Shen and 
Cannella, 2003; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Pfeffer, 1981). In this context, top 
management turnover or replacement is an important mechanism to deal with 
organizational inertia (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985), to communicate a new strategic 
direction, and to adapt strategically to changing contexts (Wiersema and Bantel, 1993). 
At the same time, changes at the top are associated with dysfunctional discontinuities, 
short-terminism (DBM, 2002), disruption of social networks, established ways of 
working among remaining top managers, and growing turbulence at lower organizational 
levels (Shen and Canella, 2002; Krishnan, Miller and Judge, 1997; Tushman and 
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Rosenkopf, 1996; Friedman and Saul, 1991). Finding a balance between continuity and 
renewal in top management teams is therefore an important organizational issue. This 
trade-off initiated the main research question that we are addressing in this paper: what 
are the performance effects of changes in the top management team? 
Based on an eleven-year period longitudinal research design with a sample of 45 
major Dutch multinationals, our paper contributes to the existing body of research in the 
following ways. First, in contrast to most researchers that have examined the performance 
effects of changes at the top (e.g., Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Leker and Salomo, 2000), we 
focus on the top team as the unit of analysis rather than on the CEO alone. With respect 
to the level of change we thus specifically consider CEO and non-CEO changes. Second, 
deviating from the tradition that CEO or other team changes imply succession events 
(e.g., Shen and Cannella, 2002), we define team changes in terms of two separate events 
that are not necessarily related: entries and exits. We investigate their separate as well as 
their combined effect on subsequent performance. Third, we analyze the type of change 
by studying characteristics of entering members – in terms of insider/outsider status - and 
exiting members– in terms of retirement (voluntary) or non-retirement (involuntary) 
departure. This allows us to examine whether specific types of entries and exits influence 
the dynamics in the top team and subsequent performance in different ways. Finally, our 
longitudinal research design enables the analysis of the effects of change frequency per 
firm over time.  
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CHANGES IN THE TOP TEAM 
Changes in the top team are a widely explored topic (Kesner and Sebora, 1994). Studies 
in this area have addressed topics ranging from antecedent conditions of CEO/team 
change to types of CEO/team changes, intermediate team processes and performance 
effects. In order to provide some structure into this vast body of literature and to be able 
to place our study into perspective, an illustrative overview of some of the relationships 
studied is provided in Figure 1. Our study focuses on the financial performance effects of 
top team changes, thereby zooming in on the link between 'CEO/top team changes' and 
'outcomes.'   
 
-------------Insert Figure 1 about here-------------- 
 
A principal issue when addressing the link between top management change and 
performance, is the question to what extent top management really matters. Here 
deterministic and voluntaristic viewpoints can be distinguished. According to the 
deterministic viewpoint, top management has no or limited effect on organizational 
outcomes including performance. Firm performance is principally a result of factors such 
as market conditions over which management has little control. This viewpoint is most 
strongly represented in the population ecology approach (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 
1989) claiming that organizations are subject to inertial forces. As such managerial 
changes at the top of the organization are believed to have no or limited effects on firm 
performance (Fizel and D’Itri, 1997). Even though management is assumed to have little 
effect, top management is generally held accountable by the firm’s stakeholders. This 
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implies that poor and good firm performance is attributed to top management’s decisions 
and actions irrespective of its effects (Pfeffer, 1977). Changing top-level management 
therefore is a strongly ritualistic, symbolic act particularly in the case of poor 
performance. 
By contrast, the voluntaristic perspective, also known as the ‘strategic choice’ 
perspective (Child, 1972) takes the opposite view assuming that organizational leaders 
are directly responsible for organizational outcomes. This view is widely shared and 
underlies much theorizing in strategic management and other organizational fields 
(Pfeffer, 1982), including the impact of individual leaders (Meindl, Ehrlich and Dukerich, 
1985).  
The theoretical framework guiding the development of hypotheses in this paper is 
rooted in the voluntaristic perspective. Spcifically, the view of the ‘upper-echelon 
perspective’ (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and the more comprehensive perspective of 
strategic leadership theory (Cannella and Monroe, 1997) is adopted, combined with 
insights from succession research. Based on Cyert and March’s (1963) concept of 
‘dominant coalition’, strategic leadership theory argues that leadership principally is a 
shared activity. Studying the whole group of top-level managers who are responsible for 
selecting and implementing the firm's strategies, therefore provides better predictions of 
organizational outcomes than the individual characteristics of a single CEO. Quite some 
empirical studies have supported the validity of this argument (Tushman, Virany and 
Romanelli, 1985; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Boeker 1992). While these studies demonstrate the added 
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value of the team focus, most of them approach team changes as a consequence of CEO 
succession rather than as a phenomenon in its own right.  
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES  
This study differs from many other executive turnover/change studies in that it takes the 
whole team as the unit of analysis. In doing so, we consider four aspects of top team 
changes. The first aspect is the level of change and explores the performance effects of 
CEO and non-CEO changes. The second aspect is the extent of team changes and 
explores the effects of minor and major changes in team composition on performance. 
The third aspect, type of change, considers the nature of these changes. Here, we analyze 
the effects of team exits and entries on performance. Apart from their overall effect, we 
also consider two types of team entries, i.e., insider and outsider entries, and two types of 
exits, i.e. retirement (voluntary) and non-retirement (involuntary) exits. Finally, we track 
the performance effects of frequent and infrequent team changes over time. Figure 2 
summarizes our research model. 
 
 
---------------Insert Figure 2 about here-------------- 
 
 
Level of change: CEO versus non-CEO effects 
As the individual who has ultimate legal authority and responsibility in today’s corporate 
hierarchy (Vancil, 1987; Kesner and Sebora, 1994: 328), the CEO has been the obvious 
topic of interest in most studies. The underlying rationale is that a new CEO can be 
instrumental in breaking established modes of operating or organizational routines 
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(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982) by initiating a new strategic 
direction and thereby improving performance (Andrews, 2001; Gordon et al., 2000; 
Kesner and Dalton, 1994). Empirical findings on performance effects of CEO succession 
have been inconclusive, however, leading to the proposition that merely changing a 
single leader or CEO is unlikely to automatically lead to performance improvements. 
Since in large, complex organizations CEOs are an integral part of a team, CEO change 
and top management change should not be regarded in isolation (Virany et al., 1992; 
Shen and Cannella, 2002). Furthermore, team changes are important levers for 
organizational adaptation (Virany et al., 1992; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1997). CEO 
changes by themselves may not introduce sufficient new and diverse experience or 
knowledge to alter established understandings and entrenched activity patterns. 
Moreover, without the commitment of incumbent team members new CEOs will be 
unable to implement new changes (Virany et al., 1992). Thus in this view, it is assumed 
that CEO changes are only effective when combined with changes in the wider top 
management team. For example, Virany et al. (1992) and Tushman and Rosenkopf 
(1997) found that executive team changes had significant effects on organization 
outcomes in both stable and turbulent contexts. As Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996: 950) 
state: ‘These results indicate that executive team changes have more profound effects on 
organization outcomes than simple CEO succession’. Moreover in both studies it 
appeared that executive team changes alone (i.e. irrespective of CEO changes) were 
sufficient to affect organizational performance. On basis of these arguments and research 
findings we state the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1a:  CEO changes by themselves have no significant impact on subsequent 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Non-CEO changes in top management teams have a significant impact 
on subsequent performance. 
Hypothesis 1c:  CEO changes combined with non-CEO changes in top management 
teams have a significant impact on subsequent performance. 
 
Extent of change in the top team 
Where in the previous section the focus was on the distinction between CEO and non-
CEO changes, this section focuses on the extent of change in the top team as a whole 
(including the CEO). In addition to the notion that organizational leadership is a shared 
activity, the strategic leadership perspective emphasizes that understanding the 
background, experiences, and values of top managers is of central importance in 
explaining the choices they make. As changes at the top effectively change the 
composition of the teams, for example in terms of social and functional background or 
personality, this may have both positive and negative effects. The positive effects are 
linked to the diversity of perspectives. Newcomers are believed to introduce new 
perspectives, to break down persistence with prior strategies (Nystrom and Starbuck, 
1984) and to introduce strategic change (Gordon et al., 2000). These positive effects may 
be particularly beneficial in more rapidly changing environments. Consistent with this 
idea, Virany et al. (1992) found a positive effect for team turnover on organizational 
performance in turbulent industries.  
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While sweeping team changes may have beneficial effects under conditions of 
turbulence and for firms in need of strategic reorientation, convergent patterns of 
adaptation seem more common than episodes of revolutionary change (Gordon et al., 
2000; Lant et al., 1992; Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett, 1993). In this regard, the social 
costs involved with changes in management become important. These costs are 
principally related to the process of team integration. New members tend to increase the 
cognitive diversity in teams, but they may also lead to a disruption of effective activity 
patterns (Grusky, 1963), friction and dysfunctional dissensus among team members, 
slowness in strategic decision- making and action (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; 
Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996) and thus hamper organizational performance (Iaquinto 
and Fredrickson, 1997). As a consequence in this case, large-scale turnover in the top 
management team will have a negative effect on performance (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 
1996). Further support for the potentially negative effects of many team changes comes 
from research on strategic change. For example, a study by Gordon et al. (2000) indicates 
that instead of yielding positive results in terms of increasing the likelihood of strategic 
reorientation and increasing the viability of the organization, top team turnover had a 
negative effect. As the authors state, it takes time for a new team to build trust and 
achieve consensus before implementing change. Top team turnover may dampen efforts 
for rapid strategic change (Gordon et al., 2000: 919). 
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Overall, we may conclude that the extent of change in the top of the organization 
can have important implications for organizational performance. However, the direction 
of these effects is ambiguous. Therefore, we state the following general hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The extent of change in the top team as a whole has a significant effect on 
subsequent performance. 
 
 
Type of change: the effects of entries and exists 
After having discussed the level and extent of change, this section discusses the type of 
change in terms of entries and exits. Most research on CEO/team changes has studied 
succession events without distinguishing between entries and exits. These studies assume 
that the two events are perfectly related in the sense that leaving executives will directly 
be replaced by new team members. However, with the exception of the CEO, top 
management team members can also leave without immediately being replaced. Top 
management teams thus expand and contract over time as a result of the restructuring of 
businesses, merger and acquisitions, or other strategic reorientations. For example, 
companies may incorporate top managers from acquired companies in their TMT in order 
to coopt their services and to smoothen the transition process (Cannella and Hambrick, 
1993; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993).  Alternatively, diversified firms may reduce their 
top management size and decide not to replace retiring executives when it refocuses on 
core activities.  In brief, departure does not necessarily mean replacement; entry does not 
automatically imply succession. Hence, exit and entry change the composition and size of 
the top management team but not always for the same reasons. From this perspective, it 
seems important to disentangle the two events.  
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An even more important reason in light of our focus on performance effects of 
team changes is that exits and entries may have different implications. New members 
bring in new perspectives, and may help to counter forces of inertia (Gordon et al., 2000). 
At the same time it will take time for new members to become effective as they must gain 
familiarity in their new roles and establish networks of contacts to accomplish activities 
(Kotter, 1982). By contrast, exits imply the loss of firm-specific, and often 
nontransferable knowledge (Kotter, 1982). On the other hand, exits of individual 
members may also imply the ‘cutting of dead wood’, or of people who have grown ‘stale 
in the saddle’ and, as such, represent impediments to effective team processes and change 
(Michel and Hambrick, 1991; Miller, 1991). Hence, entries and exits may both have 
positive and negative effects.  
In a succession study of the cement industry Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996) 
found that executive team exits and entries indeed have different impacts on subsequent 
organizational performance. When controlling for environmental turbulence, executive 
team entries were negatively related with subsequent firm performance, while senior 
team exits were positively associated with performance. Except for this study, no other 
study that we know of has explored the effects of both exits and entries at team level in 
relation to company performance. Research on executive succession has typically focused 
on the effects of CEO entry alone, or in combination with executive team exits (the latter 
usually perceived as a consequence of the former). As we examine firms in a wide variety 
of industries in the present study, we expect a general effect of team entries and exits. 
Hence, we state: 
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Hypothesis 3a: Team entries and exits have a different effect on subsequent 
performance. 
 
Furthermore, we assume that in general a good coupling of executive exits and entries 
will be advantageous for firm performance. The hiring of new executives without others 
leaving is likely to disrupt team functioning as power struggles might occur. Exits 
without new entries or with delayed entries, on the other hand, can be harmful for 
continuity and the division of responsibilities. Assuming that a balanced executive 
succession is better for team functioning than uncoupled changes, we thus state: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The better the alignment of entries and exits, the better subsequent 
performance. 
 
Type of change: the effects of insider and outsider entries 
When examining the type of entry in more detail, it appears that the one characteristic 
that has received most attention from scholars is the origin of the new entrant. In 
particular the question as to whether he or she comes from inside or outside the company 
(Kesner and Sebora, 1994: 330). Most studies (e.g. Zajac, 1990; Virany et al., 1992; Shen 
and Cannella, 2002) find that firms with insider CEOs tend to be significantly more 
profitable than firms with outsider CEOs. One reason is that information asymmetries 
between the Board and outside candidates about the characteristics of the CEO create 
adverse selection problems (Zajac, 1990). As a result, “a Board’s decision to hire an 
outside CEO will be, on average, a worse decision (in terms of performance implications) 
than a Board’s decision to hire an insider CEO” (Zajac, 1990:220). Another explanation 
is that externally recruited managers lack the social and political network inside the 
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organization, and knowledge of the organizational systems (Virany et al., 1992; Shen and 
Cannella, 2002). As a result they may have difficulty implementing change. 
So far, the effect of insider/outsider selection on subsequent performance has not 
been researched at the team level. But, also in this context we may expect to find this 
distinction to be relevant. For example, new members working for the same company for 
a long period can be relatively familiar with the existing group of top managers. In 
addition, long organizational tenure increases cohesion (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996). New and old members share similar firm-specific experiences, which facilitate 
communication and provide a strong binding factor (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
Thus, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Outside entries have a more negative effect on subsequent performance 
than entries of insiders. 
 
Type of change: the effects of voluntary and involuntary exits 
When analyzing the type of exit in more detail, it is valuable to distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary exits. In doing so, two opposing points of view emerge. From 
an internal monitoring perspective, one expects that poorly performing managers are 
removed from their functions. The resulting involuntary exit of a top manager should 
then lead to improvements in the performance of the organization due to actions taken by 
the firm to ‘clean up’. Most studies that address the voluntary or involuntary nature of 
exits from this perspective focus on the CEO, an exception is a study by Denis and Denis 
(1995). They find that involuntary, forced departures of top managers are followed by 
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significant improvements in operating performance while retirements (voluntary 
departures) are followed by smaller increases in performance.  
Another line of reasoning with respect to performance effects yields quite the 
opposite result. When a member of the top team leaves the team this will upset the status 
quo and thus result in a decline rather than an increase in performance. Furthermore, if 
the assumption is made that the more unexpected and sudden the exit occurs, the more 
disruptive the event will be for the social infrastructure (Vancil, 1987; Grusky, 1963), one 
can argue that involuntary exits have a more negative effect on firm performance than 
voluntary exits. The reasoning being that voluntary exits (e.g., retirements) can be 
carefully prepared and planned thereby limiting damage to the way of operating of the 
remainder of the team. Our hypothesis thus consists of the following two competing 
statements.  
 
Hypothesis 5a:  Involuntary exits have a more positive effect on subsequent performance 
than voluntary exits. 
Hypothesis 5b: Involuntary exits have a more negative effect on subsequent 
performance than voluntary exits. 
 
Performance effects of the frequency of changes over time  
The previous hypotheses dealt with the effect of discrete turnover events on subsequent 
performance. In the following, we will consider effects of turnover frequency in top 
teams over a period of time.  
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The frequency of exits and entries in a top team is closely linked to team tenure, 
as high turnover frequency automatically implies low average team tenure, and vice 
versa. Research on the effects of team tenure generally suggests that long average team 
tenure (or a low turnover frequency) is negatively associated with organizational change 
and innovativeness (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Longer tenured executives are 
more devoted to the maintenance of the status quo than shorter tenured executives 
(Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Frederickson, 1993). The likelihood that individual 
members will challenge the status quo is reduced in long-tenured top management teams 
(Michel and Hambrick, 1992).  
However, short average team tenure (or high turnover frequency) may have 
equally undesirable outcomes. For example, it has been suggested that it takes up to two 
years for a new CEO to fully take charge in a new job (Gabarro, 1987; Vancil, 1987). 
Shorter tenures therefore imply that top managers have less time to implement 
meaningful changes and short-term effects become the overriding concern, which 
threatens the long-term viability of the organization (DBM, 2002). In addition, short 
tenures may lead to several social costs for the team, as we have stated before. In order to 
integrate socially and to develop effective communication patterns, a certain degree of 
stability in team membership is required (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Finally, the 
frequent replacement of top management team members, including the CEO, will have a 
negative effect on the image of reliability and accountability of the firm (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Friedman and Saul, 1991).  
Virany et al. (1992) found that consistently high-performing organizations were 
moderate in their use of CEO and executive team changes. These organizations typically 
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took a more proactive approach with regard to CEO and team renewal than moderately 
performing companies. While the latter group of companies tended to initiate changes in 
response to declining performance, the group of high-performing organizations timed 
their successions in anticipation of environmental changes. Low-performing or failing 
organizations in this study either initiated no executive change, or initiated excessive 
team changes repeatedly over successive years (between 40-100% turnover). Both 
strategies resulted in further decline. A similar finding is reported in the study by 
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) on corporate bankruptcies. As opposed to survivor firms, 
the top management teams of failing firms were characterized by differing tenure 
characteristics. Some teams were very homogeneous in the sense that they were long-
standing, or had undergone a wholesale team replacement. In other teams there were 
schismatic combinations of very long-tenured and very short-tenured members.  
Concluding, some degree of turnover seems beneficial in order to introduce 
sufficient new and diverse experience or knowledge and to alter established 
understandings and entrenched activity patterns. However, high rates of turnover make it 
impossible to absorb the changes and to develop stable relationships within the team and 
with outside parties.  Thus, it seems that a medium degree of renewal is to be preferred 
over sustained stability or radical and frequent change. Consequently, we state the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between frequency of changes 
in the top team and performance over time. 
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METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
Hypotheses were tested with longitudinal data that cover 11 years of observations ranging 
from 1990 to 2000. Our sample comprises the 45 largest MNCs in the Netherlands. 
Starting from the top 50 firms on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (in terms of total 
revenues of 1996), we excluded three bi-national firms (i.e., Shell, Unilever, Fortis), one 
Belgium firm (i.e., EVC) and one firm with insufficient data, from our sample in order to 
increase the accuracy of analysis. The resulting 45 companies in our sample operate in 
various industries, including among others chemicals, publishing & printing, insurances, 
construction, and transportation. Their average sales during the observation period were 
4.3 billion € with 29,000 employees. Since the resulting sample comprises the 45 largest 
listed firms and it is thus not randomly chosen, the sample is not representative of all 165 
firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.  
 
Dependent Measures 
Firm Performance. Firm performance was assessed in terms of yearly return on assets 
(ROA), which is a widely used performance measure in CEO turnover and succession 
research (Gordon et al., 2002; Guthrie and Datta, 1998; Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Shen & 
Cannella, 2002; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996; Virany et al., 1992; Puffer and Weintrop, 
1991; Zajac, 1990).  
  19
In order to test Hypotheses 1-5, we determined the relative change in ROA 
following the TMT changes by subtracting ROA in t0 (when the change took place) from 
ROA in t+x (see also Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996; Virany et al., 1992 for a similar 
procedure used). Though change in ROA is known to be more difficult to predict than 
absolute ROA, this measure makes it possible to benchmark post-change performance 
against performance at the time the executive change occurred. While prior studies have 
studied the effects of top management team changes two years after the event (Tushman 
& Rosenkopf, 1996; Virany et al., 1992), we measured the relative change in ROA one, 
two, and three years after the event. Such a wider post-change performance horizon 
allows us to assess the robustness of the findings over time. 
For testing Hypothesis 6 we determined the average level of ROA over a two-year 
time period. As we aimed at testing performance effects of change frequency, we had to 
make sure that the measurement of performance did not overlap in time with the 
measurement of the independent variable to avoid a reversal of causal order. We used the 
two years of our time window (1999-2000) to determine average ROA and measured the 
frequency of changes in the preceding nine years (1990-1998).  
 
Independent Measures 
The Dutch corporate governance structure is based on a two-tier system in which the 
Management Board and the Supervisory Board are separate entities. As the present study 
examines changes at the top management team level, our data collection focused 
exclusively on the Management Board.  
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Level of change: CEO vs. non-CEO. For measuring changes in the top 
management team we recorded all leaving or entering executives per year by 
distinguishing between CEOs and non-CEOs. A dummy variable indicated per year and 
firm whether or not a CEO change had taken place. Change of non-CEOs was calculated 
by counting the sum of non-CEO entries and exits per year and dividing it by the size of 
the team in that year (see Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996; Virany et al.,1992).  
Extent of change. We determined the proportion of change per year and company 
by dividing the number of changes per year (CEO and non-CEO combined) by the total 
number of top management team members at the beginning of that year (proportion of 
change). It should be noted that these changes include both, exits and entries.  
Type of change: exits vs. entries. Next to the general extent of change, entries and 
exits were considered independently as not every entry automatically leads to an exit or 
vice versa. For each team, we recorded the number of exit and entry events per year and 
calculated entry and exit proportions per year and company by dividing the number of 
exits (or entries) per year by the total number of top management team members at the 
beginning of that year (proportion of exits, proportion of entries). 
Type of entries: insiders vs. outsiders. Previous research has applied varying 
degrees of rigor for defining newcomers to the top management team as insiders or 
outsiders. Some studies define top managers as outsiders when they have less than two 
years (Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993) or less than five years of organizational tenure 
(Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie and Datta, 1998). We 
follow the definition of Dalton and Kesner (1985, 1983) and define an outsider as being a 
top manager who did not work for the organization before the appointment to the board. 
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As sometimes within a single company several new entries take place per year, we coded 
entry events as outside entries only, if all entering executives had an organizational tenure 
of zero. The resulting insider/outsider variable is binary, with insiders coded as ‘0’ and 
outsiders coded as ‘1’. We also used organizational tenure of new entries as a continuous 
variable in order to validate the insider-outsider analyses. 
Type of exits: voluntary vs. involuntary. It is not easy to determine whether exits 
at the top level are voluntary or not without first-hand information from people who were 
part of the team. In order to be able to take this variable into account, we used an 
approximation that considers exits due to retirement age as planned and thus voluntary 
and all other exits as involuntary. We have to admit that the definition of latter category is 
rough, as it comprises dismissals as well as resignations. We nevertheless assume that 
this category is different from retirement exits, as dismissals as well as resignations imply 
that at least one of the parties involved judges the employment relationship as not fully 
satisfactory (Schneider, 1987). 
Retirement age in the Netherlands is 65; quite some people, however, already quit 
work at the age of 60. We thus defined all exits of executives who were 60 or older as 
retirements (voluntary exits, coded as "1"), all other exits were considered as non-
retirement (involuntary) and coded as "0".  If several people left the team in the same 
year, these exits were only counted as retirements if all were above 60.  
Frequency of change. In order to test Hypothesis 6, we measured the frequency of 
change over a nine-year period (1990-1998) and linked it to subsequent performance 
(1999-2000). We counted per firm the number of years with changes in the top 
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management team. Additionally, we distinguished between CEO and non-CEO changes. 
We did not distinguish between exits and entries as they often happen in the same year. 
   
Control Variables  
A number of control variables were included in the current study. We added a dummy 
variable distinguishing between non-manufacturing (coded as 0) and manufacturing firms 
(coded as 1) in order to have a rough sector control in our multi-industry sample. We 
controlled for firm size by using the natural logarithmic transformation of net sales in € 
per firm and year as firm size may influence both, changes in the top management team 
and performance. Furthermore, we controlled for firm performance prior to the entry or 
exit events, as performance effects might be different for firms with higher or lower 
performance rates prior to the executive change (Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993). In order to capture such effects, we measured ROA change prior to 
the top management team change by subtracting ROA at the end of t-1 from ROA t-2. 
Finally, for testing Hypotheses 2-5 that concern changes in the team as a whole (CEO and 
non-CEOs) we also controlled for the fact whether or not a CEO succession had taken 
place in a given year. For testing Hypotheses 4 and 5 we also controlled for the 
proportion of exits and entries in a given year. 
 
Analysis 
Hypotheses 1-5 were analyzed by using random-effect regression models in a pooled 
cross-sectional time series (see Greene, 2003). We analyzed 495 year-firm observations 
where the data set contains a separate entry for each firm (N=45) and year (N=11). It 
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should be noted that the number of year-firm observations is not identical for the different 
time-dependent performance measures. Taking the control variable ‘prior performance 
change’ into account, we can link the dependent variable ROA change in t+1 to entries or 
exits between 1992 and 1999 (N=360), ROA change in t+2 to entries/exits between 1992 
and 1998 (N=315), and ROA change in t+3 to entries/exits between 1992 and 1997 
(N=270).  It should also be noted that due to some missing data in the 11-year period, we 
do not have complete information for all year-firm observations. We lack performance 
data for 22 cases, insider/outsider data for 28 cases, and retirement data for 42 cases. 
Hypothesis 6 was tested with a standard OLS regression over 45 firms and linked the 
frequency of change 1990-1998 to average performance 1999-2000. 
 
RESULTS 
In total, 425 executives populated the top management teams of the 45 firms we studied 
between 1990 and 2000. Of the 170 top executives who were board members in 1990, 
only 44 were still in function in 2000. During our 11-year observation period, 227 exits 
(yearly average for the 45 firms: 20.6) and 250 entries (yearly average: 22.7) took place. 
Some firms had entries or exits of several executives per year. The maximum number of 
exits as well as entries per year and firm was 5. On average, the top management teams 
had 4.2 members, ranging from 2 to 13. The average team size slightly increased from 
1990 (4 members) to 2000 (4.5 members). Overall, the yearly percentage of exits 
increased considerably between 1990 and 2000. While in 1990 only 8% of the executives 
left the boards, the percentage of exits in 1999 was 13%, in 2000 even 35%. In the same 
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period, the percentage of entries did not change as drastically, increasing only from 11% 
to 15%.  
 
--------------Insert Table 1 about here-------------- 
 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of the 
variables used for testing hypotheses 1-5. The correlation coefficients show that larger 
firms (in terms of sales) tend to have more executive changes. Moreover, we see that a 
decrease in ROA in t-1 (prior performance) leads to higher proportions of executive 
change in t0 and to a performance increase in the following three years. Concerning our 
independent variables, only the proportion of exits within the whole team is positively 
linked to subsequent performance.  
Table 2 shows the results of testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. Concerning the control 
variables, only ROA change prior to executive changes was found to significantly 
influence subsequent ROA change. The negative sign of this relationship indicates that an 
increase in ROA in one year does in general lead to a decrease in the following year and 
vice versa. Overall, it should be noted that the variance explained by the models is rather 
low, which however is rather common when predicting performance changes.  
 
--------------Insert Table 2 about here-------------- 
 
Hypotheses 1a–c distinguished between CEO and non-CEO changes. Within the 45 firms 
studied, 69 CEO successions took place between 1990-2000. At the same time, we 
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observed changes of one or more non-CEOs in 210 out of the 495 year-firm observations. 
Hypothesis 1a assumed that CEO changes have no independent effects on subsequent 
performance. This hypothesis was supported.  Hypothesis 1b however, which assumed a 
significant effect of non-CEO changes, could not be confirmed. Neither CEO changes nor 
non-CEO changes were found to increase or decrease ROA in the following three years 
(Models 1-3). Also the interaction effect that was proposed by Hypothesis 1c could not be 
confirmed (Models 4-6). So, whether or not CEO succession is accompanied by turnover 
of other team members does not matter for subsequent changes in ROA.  
Hypothesis 2 suggested that it is the extent of change in the whole team (including 
CEO and non-CEO members) that will have effects on subsequent performance. Our 
data, however, do not support this hypothesis. The overall number of executive changes 
relative to the team size was not found to have any effects on subsequent performance 
(Models 7-9). 
 Hypothesis 3a distinguished between two types of changes, exits and entries, 
which were assumed to have different effects on subsequent performance. Our results 
confirm this hypothesis for ROA change in t1 and t2. Higher proportions of exits were 
found to lead to an increase in ROA one and two years later. At the same time, the 
proportion of entries is negatively, yet insignificantly, linked to subsequent performance 
(Table 3, Models 1-3). Concerning ROA change in t3, we see again that exits and entries 
have opposing signs, here however, neither effect is significant. For testing Hypothesis 
3b, we analyzed the interaction between exit and entry proportions. For ROA in t1, we 
found a significantly positive effect, indicating that the better exits and entries are aligned 
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the more ROA increases in the following year (Table 3, Models 4-6).  Hypothesis 3b was 
thus confirmed for ROA change in t1. 
 
--------------Insert Table 3 about here-------------- 
 
Table 4 shows the results concerning Hypotheses 4 and 5 dealing with specific types of 
exits and entries. Hypothesis 4 assumed that entries of outsiders have more negative 
effects on subsequent performance than entries of insiders. Our results show that things 
are somewhat more complex. Overall, the hiring of new executive team members from 
outside the firm is more advantageous for an increase in ROA in the following year than 
the hiring of insiders. However, when many entries take place, the hiring of outsiders 
shows negative effects (Table 4, Models 1-3). No performance effects were found two 
and three years following the entries. When using organizational tenure of new entrants 
as a continuous variable the above-mentioned results were confirmed. Lower 
organizational tenure leads to an increase in ROA in the following year, yet with a higher 
entry proportion, low organizational tenure of new entrants becomes disadvantageous. 
Overall, we can conclude that Hypothesis 4 could not be confirmed, as outside entries 
were not found to have more negative effects than inside entries. Only when teams do 
hire several new executives at the same time (higher entry proportion), is the hiring of 
outsiders disadvantageous.  
 Hypotheses 5a and b were formulated in opposing ways and compared the effects 
of retirement and non-retirement exits. Here, we find that in general exits due to 
retirement (voluntary exits) lead to a decrease in ROA in the subsequent year (Table 4, 
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Models 3). This supports Hypothesis 5a, which stated that non-retirement exits have more 
positive effects than retirement exits. No performance effects were found two and three 
years following the exits. Also, whether more or less executives leave the team due to 
retirement has no effect (Table 4, Models 4-6).  
 
--------------Insert Table 4 about here-------------- 
 
Hypothesis 6 assumed an inverted u-shaped relationship between the frequency of 
changes in a team over time and performance. In our nine-year observation period, the 
number of years with executive changes was normally distributed among the 45 firms in 
our sample, ranging from 0 to 8 years. CEO changes were less frequent. One third of the 
firms experienced no CEO succession at all, one third experienced one succession 
another third had two or three successions. Table 5 shows the means, standard deviations 
and correlations of the variables under study. Here we see that in general large firms (in 
terms of sales) have more executive changes yet realize lower returns on assets. A high 
frequency of changes in the top management team over a longer period of time seems to 
have rather negative effects on ROA, especially when it concerns CEO changes.  
 
--------------Insert Table 5 about here-------------- 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the OLS regression analysis within our sample of 45 firms. 
regression analyses. The expected inverted u-shape relationship between executive 
change and performance could not be found (Model 2). Here, we have to note that the 
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intercorrelation between the change variable and its squared term is very high (.95) and 
might distort the results. Nevertheless, with an inverted u-shaped relationship we would 
expect that the signs of their coefficients point in the opposite direction. What we did find 
is that a high frequency of CEO changes has a marginally significant negative effect on 
performance, while a high frequency of non-CEO changes does not matter (Models 3 and 
4). Adding a squared term of these variables did not improve the models.  
 
--------------Insert Table 6 about here-------------- 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Drawing upon insights from strategic leadership theory and more specifically the upper-
echelon perspective, this paper studied performance effects of changes in the top 
management team. Unlike previous studies, we focused on the whole team rather than 
just on CEOs and distinguished between level, extent, type, and frequency of changes. In 
this way, we were able to study the phenomenon of continuity or renewal at the top from 
different angles and with varying degrees of specificity.  
Overall, this approach proved to be useful as with increasing specificity, the 
performance effects of changes became more pronounced. When looking at our findings 
with regard to the first two hypotheses (level and extent), one might come to the 
conclusion that the deterministic viewpoint holds: it does not matter for firm performance 
whether or not a change takes place in the executive team. Unlike Virany et al. (1992) 
and Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996) we found neither CEO nor non-CEO changes to 
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have any impact on performance. Also, the overall extent of change in a team within a 
given year showed no significant performance effects.  
However, as soon as the type of executive change was further specified, the 
picture changed. In line Tushman & Rosenkopf (1996), we found executive exits to be 
more advantageous than executive entries. We found that exits, and especially non-
retirement exits have positive performance effects. This can be explained by the fact that 
a non-retirement exit is typically preceded by a certain level of dissatisfaction with the 
employment relationship, either on the side of the employer (in case of dismissal) or the 
side of the executive (in case of resignation). Such dissatisfaction is likely to result from a 
lack of fit between the leaving executive and the rest of the team (e.g., Jackson et al., 
1991; Wagner et al., 1984). Assuming that the departure of these executives in beneficial 
for team homogeneity and functioning, it is not surprising to find positive performance 
effects associated with it. Retirement exits do follow a different dynamic. Our results 
show that they are negatively linked to performance. Here, senior team members with 
firm-specific knowledge and experience leave the team (Kotter, 1982). Although these 
departures are usually planned, our results show that the negative effects of such a loss 
can obviously not immediately be compensated. 
Executive entries were in general not linked with performance. This, however, 
also changed under certain conditions. Entries showed positive performance effects when 
closely aligned with exits or when it concerned outside entries. Larger numbers of outside 
entries at the same time, however, led to a decrease in performance. The generally 
positive effects of outside entries might be explained by the fact that outsiders bring in 
new perspectives and can help to counter forces of inertia (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; 
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Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Gordon et al., 2000). Many entries of outsiders, however, 
increase socialization costs (Datta & Guthrie, 1998) and change the character of the team 
to such an extent that its functioning becomes disrupted. Interestingly, CEO research 
typically finds inside successors to lead to better performance (Zajac, 1990; Virany et al., 
1992; Shen and Cannella, 2002). Unfortunately, the numbers of CEO successions in the 
current sample was too limited for analyzing potential differences in outside entries at the 
CEO and non-CEO level. Our results combined with findings from succession research 
seem to indicate that outside entries are only advantageous when non-CEOs are 
concerned. A possible explanation might be that compared with CEOs, non-CEOs depend 
less on firm-specific knowledge and an established network of contacts to accomplish 
their task successfully.  
At this point, it might be important to focus on the two different time perspectives 
we employed. In the first set of analyses (concerning level, extent, and type of change) 
we considered discrete changes per year and firm and linked them to performance in the 
three following years. The performance effects we were talking about in the previous 
paragraphs concern mainly short-term effects. Except for executive exits, we found no 
performance effects that lasted longer than one year following the change. This might be 
explained by the fact that additional changes might take place that then overlap the 
effects of the previous ones. 
In the last analysis, we focused on potential cumulative effects of changes over a 
longer period of time. While the level of change (CEO vs. non-CEO) did show no 
distinctive performance effect in our yearly analysis, this aspect became important when 
studying the frequency of change over time. We found that firms with executive changes 
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in several consecutive years did not perform any different from firms with fewer or no 
changes in the same period. However, firms with up to three CEO changes in a nine-year 
period, performed worse than firms with fewer or no such changes.  
Overall, the paper showed that next to CEO succession research, it is useful to 
also study changes in the top management team as a whole. We hope that our framework 
provided some guidance of how to deal with the additional complexities involved. Our 
results indicated that renewal of top management teams in terms of non-retirement exits 
and limited outside entries can be beneficial for firm performance in the following year, 
especially when exits and entries are well aligned. On the other hand, a certain degree of 
continuity is also warranted. Too many outside entries at the same time were found to be 
disadvantageous in the short-run, while many CEO successions in a row were found to be 
disadvantageous in the longer-run.   
 
Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research 
This study is an initial step in investigating the effects of changes at the team level on 
performance. Further research is needed to provide insight into the complex effects of 
team changes in different organizational contexts. For example, in the present study we 
examined the performance effects of team changes based on a set of companies 
originating from a variety of industries. As companies in different organizational contexts 
may exhibit different turnover patterns as a result of the turbulence they face in their 
environments, this can be considered as an important limitation of this study. For 
example, the studies by Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996) of the cement industry and 
Virany et al. (1992) of the minicomputer industry suggest that incremental change of top 
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management is positively associated with organizational performance in stable contexts 
but less so in turbulent contexts.  
A further limitation is the use of retirement versus non-retirement as a proxy for 
voluntary or involuntary turnover. Although widely used, a more subtle measure is 
needed to fully capture the reasons behind a particular turnover event. Researchers face 
significant difficulties in distinguishing voluntary from involuntary resignations as 
companies seldom are fully open about the true reasons behind turnover (Denis and 
Denis, 1995; Shen and Canella, 2002; Leeker and Salomo, 2000). A more fine-grained 
measure, for example between 'unavoidable change' (retirement), 'voluntary dismissal' 
(resignation) and 'involuntary dismissal' (dismissal) (c.f., Leeker and Salomo, 2000),  
could thus be helpful. 
Similar concerns may be raised against our operationalization of the 
insider/outsider construct measured by the number of years new entrants worked with the 
firm before they entered the top management team. We used a dichotomized 
categorization as well as a continuous definition of insider-/outsidership, both based on 
organizational tenure of new entrants. However, finer and alternative distinctions of the 
insidership can be thought of. One relevant category is the contrast between intra-firm, 
intra-industry and outside-industry successions (Zhang and Rajogopalan, 2003). Yet, also 
non-tenure related measures may be considered. New members can be relatively similar 
to incumbent members in terms of firm-specific experiences and skills, but may be 
different in other important fields such as gender, race or functional background. 
Evidence suggests that such differences can be equally significant in influencing team 
dynamics (c.f., Wagner et al, 1984; Jackson et al., 1991).  
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A final limitation of the study, which may be considered a strength at the same 
time, is related to the national identity of our sample. Most turnover studies are based on 
US samples. This applies to succession studies in general and to upper echelon studies in 
particular. To our knowledge, research on team changes involving non-US companies is 
practically nonexistent. As a result, the national context of strategic leadership is largely 
ignored as a potentially important determinant of top management change and outcomes 
(Olie and Van Iterson, 2003). For example, team-based philosophies may be more 
consistent with some cultures than others (Kirkman and Shapiro, 1997). These attitudes 
may have important implications for the team dynamics that we have described in this 
paper. Similarly, leadership structures tend to vary across countries as a result of cultural 
values (Hofstede, 2002) as well as institutional context (Olie and Van Iterson, 2003). 
These differences may hold significant implications for the effects of top management 
team changes on performance. These are all issues that can be taken up for further 
research.     
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Antecedent conditions CEO/Top team 
changes
Intermediate 
(team) processes 
Outcomes 
FOR EXAMPLE: 
 
Financial-economic focus 
(e.g. Huson, Parrino and 
Starks, 2001; Allgood and 
Farrell, 2000; Furtado and 
Karan, 1990) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions 
(e.g.  Krishnan, Miller and 
Judge, 1997; Canella and 
Hambrick, 1993; Walsh, 
1988,1989) 
 
Demographic dissimiliarity 
(e.g. Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1996; Jackson 
et. al, 1991; Wagner, 
Pfeffer and O’Reilly, 1984) 
FOR EXAMPLE: 
 
CEO succession 
(e.g., Beatty and Zajac, 1987; 
Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers and 
Owers, 1989; Leker and Salomo, 
2000) 
 
CEO versus other members of the 
top team (e.g. Shen and Cannella, 
2002; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 
1996; Virany, Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1992) 
 
CEO entries ( and team changes) 
(e.g. Beatty and Zajac, 1987; 
Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers and 
Owers, 1989; Zajac, Kesner and 
Dalton, 1994; Shen and Cannella, 
2002; Virany et al, 1992; Boeker, 
1997) 
 
CEO exits (and team changes) 
(e.g, Shen and Cannella, 2002; 
Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Boeker, 
1997) 
 
Team changes 
(Boeker, 1997; Barker, Patterson 
and Mueller, 2001) 
 
Frequency of CEO (and team 
changes) 
(e.g., Grusky, 1961; Miller, 1991; 
Virany et al., 1992; Hambrick and 
d'Aveni, 1992) 
Figure 1: An illustrative overview of research addressing changes at the top 
FOR EXAMPLE: 
 
Strategic or organizational 
change  
(e.g. Boeker 1997, 1992; 
Miller, 1993) 
 
Organizational effectiveness 
(e.g. Miller, 1991; Grusky, 
1963) 
 
Shareholder reactions 
(e.g. Beatty and Zajac, 1987; 
Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers and 
Owers, 1989) 
 
Financial performance 
(e.g. Shen and Cannella, 
2002; Virany, Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1992) 
FOR EXAMPLE: 
 
Firm specific knowledge  
(e.g. Shen and Cannella, 
2002) 
 
Change initiatives 
(Miller, 1991; Boeker, 
1997) 
 
Risk of adverse selection
(Zajac, 1990; Shen and 
Cannella, 2002) 
 
Social cohesion 
(Hambrick and D’Aveni, 
1992) 
 
Resource diversity 
(Boeker, 1997; 
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 
1992) 
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Team changes 
 
CEO  
Non-CEO 
 
Exits 
 
Entries 
 
Performance 
Voluntary or 
involuntary 
Insider or 
outsider 
 
 
 
 
Level and 
extent of 
change 
 
 
 
Type 
of 
change 
H1 
H3 
H5 H4
Figure 2:  Research model 
Frequency 
of change 
over time 
H6 
  
1990 
 
 
1998 
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Table 1: Means, standard deviations and correlations 
 Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Sector 0.55 0.49 1.0            
2. Net sales (ln)  14.45 1.20 -.23*** 1.0           
3. Prior ROA change 0.04 4.03  .02 -.03 1.0          
4. CEO change 0.14 0.35 -.02  .13** -.09 1.0         
5. Non-CEO change prop. 0.20 0.30 -.05  .23*** -.08  .06 1.0        
6. TMT change proportion 0.23 0.34  .04  .15*** -.15**  .44***  .68*** 1.0       
7. TMT exit proportion  0.10 0.18  .04  .17*** -.15**  .43***  .50***  .72*** 1.0      
8. TMT entry proportion 0.13 0.24  .03  .10* -.10*  .30***  .58***  .86*** .27*** 1.0     
9. Outside entries 0.26 0.44  .07  .04  .10 -.09  .02  -.10*  .02 -.14* 1.0    
10. Retirement exits 0.44 0.49  .11  .05  .01  .05 -.19* -.19* -.30** -.09 -.06 1.0   
11. ROA change t1-t0 0.21 4.45  .01 -.05 -.12*  .05  .02  .08  .16*** .01 -.03 -.12 1.0  
12. ROA change t2-t0 0.30 5.36  .05 -.07 -.15*  .04  .04  .05  .12* -.01 -.03 -.12 .60*** 1.0 
13. ROA change t3-t0 0.56 5.29  .03  .03 -.15* -.00  .06  .07  .04 .07 -.02 -.17 .37*** .61*** 
               
TMT: top management team; * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001 
  42
 
Table 2: Level and extent of change 
 
Variables 
 
Model 1 
ROA 
change t1 
Model 2 
ROA 
change t2 
Model 3 
ROA 
change t3 
Model 4 
ROA 
change t1 
Model 5 
ROA 
change t2 
Model 6 
ROA 
change t3 
Model 7 
ROA 
change t1 
Model 8 
ROA 
change t2 
Model 9 
ROA 
change t3 
Sector   .01  .26 .42  .01  .22 .38 -.00  .27 .44 
Net sales (ln)  -.19 -.24 .14 -.19 -.27 .13 -.19 -.24 .16 
Prior ROA change -.13* -.22* -.22* -.13* -.23** -.22* -.13* -.22* -.22* 
CEO change  .34  .51 -.91  .58 -1.32 -2.04  .16 .26 -1.32 
Non-CEO change 
    proportion 
 .90  .62 1.79 1.04 -.22 1.15    
CEO change times 
    non-CEO change 
   -.88 6.93 5.30    
TMT change 
     proportion 
       .77  .84 1.75 
          
Wald Chi2 6.69 8.09 8.09 6.79 11.64 9.53 6.75 8.33 8.06 
R2 overall 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
TMT: top management team; values are regression coefficients; * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001. 
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Table 3: Type of change: exits vs. entries 
 
Variables 
 
Model 1 
ROA 
change t1 
Model 2 
ROA 
change t2 
Model 3 
ROA 
change t3 
Model 4 
ROA 
change t1 
Model 5 
ROA 
change t2 
Model 6 
ROA 
change t3 
Sector   . 07   .31   .41   .10   .31    .48 
Net sales (ln)  -.22  -.26   .16  -.18  -.26   .17 
Prior ROA change  -.12  -.22*  -.22*  -.11  -.21*  -.23* 
CEO change  -.66  -.67  -.88  -.58  -.67 -1.06 
TMT exit  
    Proportion  
 5.81**  5.57*  -.18   .72  6.37 -2.65 
TMT entry  
    Proportion 
 -.86  -.85  2.43 -2.72*  -.48 1.39 
TMT exit times 
   entry proportion 
   17.79*** 13.35 13.00 
       
Wald Chi2 15.64* 12.28 8.56 26.76*** 12.28 10.17 
R2 overall 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04 
TMT: top management team; values are regression coefficients; * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001. 
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Table 4: Type of exits and entries 
 
Variables 
 
Model 1 
ROA 
change t1 
Model 2 
ROA 
change t2 
Model 3 
ROA 
change t3 
Model 4 
ROA 
change t1 
Model 5 
ROA 
change t2 
Model  6 
ROA 
change t3 
Sector   .06   .32   .39   .19   .34   .47 
Net sales (ln) t0  -.34  -.23   .15  -.09  -.30   .24 
Prior ROA change  -.12  -.22*  -.22*  -.14*  -.21*  -.21* 
CEO change  -.29  -.71  -.79  -.48   .15   .84 
TMT exit  
    proportion  
  4.84**  5.66*  -.43  6.74*  7.91*  -.69 
TMT entry  
    proportion 
 -.04  -.96  2.15 -1.39 -1.08  1.47 
Outsider   4.99***  -.70   .57    
Outsider times  
   TMT entry prop. 
-14.47***  2.03   .09    
Retirement    -3.66*  -.33 -2.41 
Retirement times 
    TMT exit prop. 
    8.25 -4.16  2.03 
       
Wald Chi2 29.91*** 12.31 8.73 18.40* 12.19 7.51 
R2 overall 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 
TMT: top management team; values are regression coefficients; *p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001. 
  45
Table 5: Means, standard deviations and correlations 
 Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
         
1. Sector  0.55 0.50 1.0      
2. Average net sales  (ln) 1990-1998 14.32 1.14 -.24 1.0     
3. No. of years with TMT changes 
1990-1998 
 3.98 2.04 -.12  .41** 1.0    
4. No.  of years   with CEO changes 
1990-1998 
 1.08 0.92 -.11 .34* .41** 1.0   
5. No. of years with non-CEO 
changes 1990-1998 
 1.97 1.67 -.13 .48*** .93*** .18 1.0  
6. Average ROA 1999-2000  9.20 4.76 .16 -.52*** -.29† -.40** -.22 1.0 
†≤.10* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001.  
 
Table 6: Frequency of changes over time 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sector   .04    .02    .03  .04 
Net sales (ln) 1990-1988  -.46**  -.50**  -.43**  -.53** 
No. of years with TMT 
  changes 1990-1998 
 -.09  -.56    
Squared no. of years with 
   TMT changes 1990-1998 
    .50   
No.  of years   with CEO 
  changes 1990-1998 
   -.26†  
No. of years with non-CEO 
  changes 1990-1998 
    .03 
     
R2 .27** .30** .33*** .27*** 
    Values are beta coefficients; †≤.10* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001. 
 
 
 
